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tion. " 19
In conclusion, the Quirk court found that section 375 of chapter
190 was violative of both the state and federal due process
provisions. In addition to the due process violations, the court
further found that the statute was violative of the state
constitution provision guaranteeing that the state will collectively
bargain with a union. 200 The Federal Constitution has no equivalent provision that explicitly provides for the state to collectively
bargain with a union. The Federal Constitution has, however, a
Contract Clause which guarantees that the state will not breach its
contracts. As previously mentioned, the Second Circuit, in
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters within
the City, applying the Contract Clause, similarly found section
375 of chapter 190 to be unconstitutional.
NEW YORK COUNTY
1
Hope v. Perales 20

(decided April 15, 1991)

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Prenatal
Care Assistance Program (PCAP)2 02 as violative of the rights of
pregnant eligible women, 20 3 because it did not provide funds for
eligible women for whom an abortion is medically necessary.
The court found that "[t]he right of a pregnant woman to choose
an abortion in circumstances where it is medically indicated is
one component of the right of privacy rooted in the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution. ' ' 2 04 Therefore, the
court held that PCAP's exclusion of funding for medically
necessary abortions was unconstitutional under the due process
clause, 20 5 the equal protection clause 206 and sections 1 and 3 of
199. Quirk, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 424.

200.
201.
1991).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 425.
150 Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. New York County
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2520-2529 (McKinney 1992).
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 986-87, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
Id. at 993-94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Id. at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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article XVI120 7 of the New York State Constitution.
Consequently, the court enjoined defendants from withholding
20 8
such funding from eligible women.
The plaintiffs included two women with incomes between 100
and 185 percent of the federal poverty line, on behalf of all
pregnant women similarly situated. Plaintiffs also included
several physicians, a certified nurse-midwife, two members of
the clergy, family planning organizations and seven medical
clinics, all of which serviced women in the PCAP income
bracket, as well as advocacy organizations who represent women
in this bracket. The suit was instituted against the Commissioner
of the New York State Department of Social Services, and the
20 9
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health.
The plaintiffs did not seek to terminate all services offered by
PCAP, rather they claimed that the program "is underinclusive in
its blanket exclusion of funds for all abortions without exception,
[even] to preserve the life of the mother." 2 10 Thus, the plaintiffs
sought to "expand the breadth" of the program to include financing for abortions in the case of medical necessity. 2 11
The court began its analysis by reviewing the statutory scheme
established on the federal level and its counterpart adopted by
New York. The Prenatal Care Assistance Program was
established on the federal level to authorize reimbursement for
pregnancy related medical services to women with incomes
206. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982; N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof.")
207. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 998, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981; N.Y. CONST. art.
XVII, §§ 1, 3.
208. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 1001, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 983. The court,
however, stayed the order enjoining the denial of such funding and advised
that "as this is a case involving the constitutionality of a state statute, appeal
may be taken directly to the Court of Appeals." Id. At the time this issue went
to press, the court of appeals had remanded the case to the appellate division,
and the case has been argued before the first department. 78 N.Y.2d 1004, 580
N.E.2d 764, 575 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1991).

209. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 987, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
210. Id. at 989, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
211. Id.
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between 100 and 185 percent of the poverty line. 2 12 New York
codified chapter 584 in its section 2522 of the Public Health
Law, which expressly provides that "funding is only available to
the extent of federal reimbursement - which does not include
13
funding for abortion." 2
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' challenge to the prenatal assistance program under the due process clause of the New
York State Constitution. The due process clause of the New York
State Constitution, found in section 6 of article I, provides in part
that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.",2 14 The court stated that:
212. Id. at 990, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975. Those with incomes below 100
percent of the poverty line are covered under other programs. Id.
213. Id. at 990, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975-76. Section 2522 of New York Public
Health Law states:
Comprehensive prenatal care services available under the prenatal
care assistance program include:
(a) prenatal risk assessment;
(b) prenatal care visits;
(c) laboratory services;
(d) health education for both parents regarding prenatal nutrition
and other aspects of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco use, substance
abuse, use of medication, labor and delivery, family planning to prevent
future unintended pregnancies, breast feeding, infant care and parenting;
(e) referral for pediatric care;
(f) referral for nutrition services including screening, education,

counseling, follow-up and provision of services under the women,
infants and children's program and the supplemental nutrition assistance
program;
(g) mental health and related social services including screening
and counseling;
(h) transportation services for prenatal care services;
(i) labor and delivery services;

(j) post-partum services including family planning services;
(k) inpatient care, specialty physician and clinic services which are
necessary to assure a healthy delivery and recovery;
(1) dental services;
(m) emergency room services;

(n) home care; and
(o) pharmaceuticals.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2522 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
214. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
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"Historically, the New York Court of Appeals has read our State
Constitution expansively, broadening the scope of individual
rights and liberty accorded by the Federal Constitution, finding
the basis for such rights in our state constitution.,, 2 15 The court

first analyzed the statute, which deals with social and economic
issues, on its face under substantive due process, and applied
rational basis scrutiny. It then addressed the statute as it impacted
on the fundamental right to an abortion and, here, applied strict
scrutiny.
According to the court, the test applied to a challenge to a
statutory scheme on substantive due process grounds is "whether
there is some fair, just and reasonable connection between it and
the promotion of the health, comfort, safety and welfare of
society. ' '2 16 Thus, a "'regulation which is reasonable in relation
to its subject and is adopted in the interest of the community is
due process.' '"217 In applying this test, the court grants great
deference to the decisions of the legislature. Plaintiffs, therefore,
have a heavy burden in proving that a regulation is not rationally
related to the police power.
Nonetheless, the court found that PCAP was not rationally
related to its stated objective and held that in excluding funds for
all abortions it was facially deficient. 2 18 The court reasoned that
PCAP provides medical assistance for all services related to
pregnancy and childbirth. Yet, funds are not available for
abortion even if the procedure is medically necessary. This, the
court concluded, is inconsistent with the regulation's stated
215. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 993, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978 (citing People v.
Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991);

Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566
N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991); People v. P.J. Video, 68

N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1091 (1987); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406

N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894,
384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976)).
216. Id. at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978 (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 38
N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 44, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975)).

217. Id. (quoting West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1983)).
218. Id.
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objective - "to combat infant mortality and promote healthier
babies." 2 19 Hope, for example, was a carrier of sickle cell
anemia, was twenty-one weeks pregnant and was informed that
an abortion was medically necessary in the circumstances. Hope
was ineligible for all Medicaid because her income fell above 100
percent of the federal poverty line. However, with income less
than 185 percent above the poverty line, Hope fell within the
PCAP guidelines and lacked the financial resources to pay for the
abortion.
The court cited the case of plaintiff Hope as an illustration of
the hardship Hope and other similarly situated women encounter.
"Plainly, if Hope carried to term and gave birth all services
available under PCAP would be available notwithstanding the
danger to her health and the baby's probable affliction with sickle
cell anemia." -0 The court found this result was "not 'fairly',
'justly', 'rationally' or 'reasonably' related to combating infant
mortality or low birth weight." 22 1
The court then addressed the fundamental right to privacy component read in the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution. 2 22 The court stated that: "It is an eligible woman's
exercise of the fundamental right to abortion which triggers
PCAP'S unconstitutional restriction. '"2 23 Although the legislature
can express a preference for childbirth, its conduct of providing
funds for childbirth regardless of the dangers to maternal and
fetal health directly impacts on the exercise of the pregnant,
eligible woman's fundamental right to choose abortion. 224
The threshold inquiry in evaluating whether a regulation penalizes the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right is whether
the regulation serves a compelling state interest and whether the
regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. Here, the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (citing Klein v. Broderick, 145
A.D.2d 145, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 705,
536 N.E.2d 627, 539 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1989)).
223. Id. at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
224. Id. at 996, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
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court found that the state had no compelling state interest or even
an important state interest "when certain eligible recipients are
denied assistance in spite of their medical condition." ' 225 The
court further stated that "to condition such medical assistance on
the result desired by the state and not on the medical condition of
the pregnant woman effectively wrests control from the pregnant
woman over her body and health." 226
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' claim that chapter 584
violates article XVII, sections 1 and 3 of the New York State
Constitution by denying aid to the class of women in medical
need to terminate their pregnancies. The court pointed out that
"public assistance to the needy is a matter of significant interest
in this State, provision for which is expressly included in our
State Constitution." 2 27 Section 1 requires that the state provide
aid to the needy. 22 8 The legislature is granted great deference in
defining the term "needy" and in determining the amount of aid
provided. However, the Legislature cannot refuse aid to those
whom it has classified as "needy." ' 22 9 Section 3 requires the state
to protect and promote the health of the inhabitants of the
State. 2 30 The court found that the program's denial of funds for
medical assistance to needy women violated both clauses because
it refused all aid to those in need of a medically necessary
abortion. Further, it violated the state's constitutional obligation
to protect and promote the health of its residents. The assertion
by pregnant women in need of medically necessary abortions
225. Id.
226. Id. at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
227. Id. (citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400
N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977)).

228. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and support of the needy
are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its

subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may
from time to time determine.").
229. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980-81.
230. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3 ("The protection and promotion of the
health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its subdivisions
and in such manner, and by such means as the legislature shall from time to
time determine.").
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the state to provide assistance. 23 1
The last claim addressed by the court was the plaintiffs' contention that PCAP violated the state equal protection clause. The
plaintiffs argued that the right to choose is a fundamental right
and the state's denial of funds for the exercise of that right
interferes with women's lives in a way that "does not control and
alter the lives of men. ' 2 32 Once the court identified that the
claim involved a regulation penalizing the exercise of a
fundamental right, it then determined that such violation triggers
the application of strict scrutiny or the compelling state interest
test. This test requires a demonstration by the state of a
compelling state interest and statutory means that are narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose. 233 Here, the court found that
although "there is no constitutional obligation to pay for the
medical care of the poorfl, the New York State Equal Protection
Clause guarantees equal participation in State benefits once such
2 34
benefits are extended."
The state argued that PCAP serves the state's compelling
interest in promoting healthier babies and reducing the incidence
of infant mortality. However, the court found that "there can be
no compelling justification for that medical assistance program
which in practice endangers the health and lives of eligible
women for whom an abortion is medically necessary, women
whom the Legislature has expressly identified as needy in regard
to medical care."' 2 35 PCAP, which in practice endangers the
health and lives of women in need of medically necessary
abortions, falls short of meeting the compelling state interest.
Indeed, the court concluded that "balanced against the interest of
231. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 998, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981.

232. Id.
233. Id. at 998-99, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981 (citing Matter of Rosenstock v.
Scaringe, 40 N.Y.2d 563, 564, 357 N.E.2d 347, 348, 388 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877
(1976)).
234. Id. at 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The court was referring to a federal
constitutional right. As discussed above, the New York State Constitution does
require aid to the needy.
235. Id. at 999-1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
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the pregnant woman in choosing a medically necessary abortion,
the State's interest is insufficient and as effectuated through
PCAP, far too burdensome on the eligible woman's right, to
sustain. "

236

State courts, in their determination of individual rights, may
always provide for greater rights to their citizens, but may not
fall below the minimum standards mandated by the United States
Constitution if the right in question is one that is also protected
under the Federal Constitution.
In this case the court found that the right to abortion is a
fundamental right protected by the "right of privacy rooted in the
due process clause of the New York State Constitution." 237
The federal standard, when analyzing a statute pursuant to a
substantive due process claim, is also rational basis scrutiny if the
statute merely impacts economic and social concerns. 23 8 The
federal courts also require a strict scrutiny analysis under both the
Due Process 239 and Equal Protection 240 Clauses, when that same
statute, though providing for economic and social regulation, also
impacts upon a fundamental right. A state must demonstrate a
compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means in order to
infringe upon that fundamental right.
The United States Supreme Court encountered the issue of re24 1
strictions on abortion funding in the case of Harris v. McRae,
which involved denial of funds for abortions except when the life
of the mother would be endangered by continuing the pregnancy
or when the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Justice
Stewart, writing for a 5 to 4 majority, stated that a state has no
obligation to pay for those medically necessary abortions for
which federal funding is unavailable under the Hyde
Amendment. 242 The Court in Harris stated, "a woman's freedom
236. Id. at 1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
237. Id. at 993-94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
448 U.S. 297 (1980).

242. Id. at 308. "Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited -- either
by an amendment to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of
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of choice [does not] carr[y] with it a constitutional entitlement to
the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." ' 243 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion,
pointed out that the state's refusal to fund a medically necessary
abortion constitutes an intrusion upon the constitutionally protected decision to have an abortion. The state, by design and in
effect, causes indigent pregnant women to bear children. Hence,
this is not just an expression of the state's preference towards
child-bearing but rather an active encroachment upon the fundamental right for a woman to choose whether to have an abortion. 244
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have eroded the
federal protection for reproductive choice even further. 24 5
Although Roe v. Wade246 has not been overruled, the basic
premise of that decision, that reproductive choice is a fundamental right subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review, seems to
be under scrutiny by at least some members of the Court. 24 7 In
Health, Education, and Welfare or by a joint resolution - the use of any
federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program
except under certain specified circumstances." Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
See Hyde Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 440, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 Stat. 923,
926 (1979).
243. Harris,448 U.S. at 316.
244. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun strongly dissented. Id. at 329. They interpreted the abortion funding
cases as "imping[ing] on the due process right recognized in Roe ..... Id. at
333. The Justices, by focusing their interest on potential life, argued that the
state neglected the mother's health and restricted her freedom. Id. at 329. Note
that two of the three dissenters, Justices Brennan and Marshall, have now
retired from the Supreme Court.
245. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (holding that
"[t]he government has no constitutional duty to subsidize" abortion); Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2976 (1990)
(upholding a parental notice statute containing judicial bypass procedures);
Hodgsen v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 2944 (1990) (upholding a 48 hour
waiting period on minors seeking abortions); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (a state's refusal to fund abortions does
not violate a woman's right to an abortion).
246. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
247. See Eileen Kaufman, Symposium, The Supreme Court and Local
Government Law - 7he 1989-90 Term, 7 TOURO L. REv. 457, 458 (1991).
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Hope, the trial judge, on independent state grounds, found that
reproductive choice is a fundamental right under the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution. 24 8
In light of the Supreme Court's possible reconsideration of
Roe's principles, other states, like New York, have addressed the
issue of abortion funding. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 249 held that while there is no

fundamental right to funding for an abortion, the right to choose
is a fundamental right under the New Jersey State
Constitution. 250 Therefore, the court found that the "challenged
statute discriminate[d] between those for whom medical care is
necessary for child birth and those for whom an abortion is
medically necessary." 25 1 Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that the restriction on Medicaid funding for
medically necessary abortions impermissibly burdens the
fundamental right to privacy guaranteed under the due process
clause of article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 25 2 In Doe v. Maher,253 the Superior Court of
Connecticut held that a regulation that reduced Medicaid funding
of abortions to those necessary to save the mother's life was in
violation of the fundamental right to choose under both the due
process clause 25 4 and equal protection clause25 5 of the
248. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
249. 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).

250. Id. at 937.
251. Id.
252. Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass.

1981). The plaintiffs argued that the "restriction [was] an impermissible
burden on the exercise of a fundamental right secured by the guarantee of due

process implicit in art. 10 of our Declaration of Rights [3;" the court agreed.
Id. at 397.
253. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
254. Id. at 157; see CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.").
255. Maher, 515 A.2d at 162; see CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20. ("No person

shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation
or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political

rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or
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Connecticut State Constitution.
The court omitted its discussion of the plaintiffs' claims that
chapter 584 violates provisions of the New York State
Constitution including the free exercise of religion clause for
purposes of publication. The court concluded that PCAP was not
violative of the free exercise clause.
CIVIL COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
55 Avenue C Housing Development
Fund Corporation v. Serrano 256
(published January 23, 1991)

Tenant claimed that a privately-owned cooperative's involvement with the state, constituted state action such that he was
guaranteed a due process right under the New York State25 7 and
Federal2 58 Constitutions to notice and cause of eviction before
such eviction could take place. The court held, under the state
constitution, that there was "meaningful State participation" with
the cooperative's activities so as to constitute state action and,
thus, to entitle the tenant to procedural due process of law. 259
The cooperative brought this proceeding to evict a tenant on the
ground that he was "holding over after termination of his
term. "260 The tenant moved to dismiss the action because he did
not receive notice for the cause of eviction.
Prior to becoming a cooperative, the building was owned and
managed by the City of New York. To assist the tenants in
forming a cooperative, the city funded the building's rehabilitation, gave money to the tenants to purchase the building and
physical or mental disability.").
256. N.Y. L., Jan. 23, 1991, at 24 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1991).
257. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
258. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
259. 55Ave. C, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1991, at 24.

260. Id.
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